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RECENT CASES
of cases. The third proposal is to distinguish defamations purely on
the basis of whether they are major or minor, requiring proof of
damage where they are minor. Whether the distinction advocated
here would be any betier than the distinction between libel and
slander is doubtful. The fourth is to distinguish on the basis of the
extent of publication.
The most logical step would be to merge libel and slander into a
single body of defamatory law, consequently more uniform, based
on more sound reason, far less subject to misinterpretation, and yet
flexible so that it can adapt itself to future developments.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-CONSTrruTIONAL

LAw-ZoNING

ORDIN-

PROHIBITING AN EXISTING USE. The plaintiff sued the City of
Tallahassee to enjoin enforcement of a city zoning ordinance passed
in 1948 requiring the company to discontinue the operation of a gasoline service station located directly across from the entrance to the
capitol building. In 1936 a comprehensive zoning plan included P's
area within a residential district and forbade such a use of the property. Later that year the area was re-zoned to allow gasoline stations. During this time P bought the land and made valuable improvements. In 1939 the district was again zoned and gasoline stations were served with ten years notice to liquidate and move out.
The ordinance complained of here did not accelerate the move but
changed the district to residential again. The U. S. District Court
held that the ordinance was valid and enforceable and dissolved the
temporary restraining order. On appeal it was held, with one dissent,
that the ordinance was justified as a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the city as a matter of legislative discretion and was not unconstitutional by way of being an arbitrary interference with vested
rights or unreasonable as having no relation to the general welfare.
Standard Oil Company vs. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (1950).
The courts are tending to recognize the power of the municipality
to force discontinuance of existing uses which although not nuisances
themselves are discimmoding to the district,' but there is such authority clinging to the older traditions.' This type of zoning ordinance
has been upheld under the police power if it meets the requirements
that it is the result of a proper enabling statute' and is passed pursuant to a comprehensive and reasonable zoning plan seeking the
best possible zoning for the general public benefit.' If the existing
ANCE

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. 8. 365, 887 (1926) (first inportant zoning case to reach the Supreme Court); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 289 U. S.
894 (1915); Duficon Concrete Products Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N J. 509,
64 A.2d 347 (1949); 8 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 1 25, 183 (Sd ed. 1950).
2 Womens Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F. 2d 593 (8th
Cir. 1932);
Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling Green 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W.2d 960

(1932); People v. Stanton, 125 Misc. 215, 211 N.Y. Supp. 438 (1925).
8 State ex rel. Taylor v. Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 183 So. 114 (1931); cf.
Bismarck v. Hughes, 53 N. D. 838, 208 N.W. 711 (1926).
4 Geneva Inv. Co. v. St. Louis, 87 F. 2d 83 (8th Cir. 1937); Standard Oil Co.
v. Bowling Green, supra note 2.
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use has any element of nuisance, especially if located close to public
places or inflammables' or if a reasonable time is given, that existing
use may be ordered to be discontinued.' However, the courts will
usually not sanction the compulsory discontinuance of a use for
aesthetic reasons.'
A presumption of validity protects zoning laws,' and they are liberally construed to accomplish their purposes.' To find a zoning ordinance invalid is becoming increasingly difficult, but if it is shown
that there has been a taking of property without due process of law.'
or an interference with vested property rights so as to radically alter
the value of the use,' some courts will strike down such laws. The
power of the municipality to force an existing gasoline station out
of business, as in the instant case, by the use of the police power to
re-zone an area, can be done in spite of pecuniary loss to the owner
particularly if the station is in a residential district" where it may
be classed as a nuisance " or if it is located close to public areas or
structures where it might become a fire hazard.'
It is to be noted that the Florida statutes"e are nearly identical with
those of North Dakota" with regard to the municipal zoning powers.
5
State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607 (1939); Des
Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Ia. 1096, 184 N. W. 823 (1921); Interstate Oil
Co. v. Orange, 11 N.J. Misc. 89, 165 Atl. 99 (1933); Byrne, Constitutionality of a
General Zoning Ordinance, 11 Marq. L. Rev. 189, 211 (1927).
a State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929);
see Austin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667, 278 N. W. 727, 730 (1938).
McCrae v. City of Fayetteville, 198 N.C. 51, 150 S.E. 810 (1929); cf. Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N. E. 601 (1905); City of
St. Louis v. Evraiff, 303 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489, 495 (1923). Contra: City of Miami
Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364 (1941)
(if the aesthetic
benefits derived promote the public pleasure).
8 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 1, State ex rel.
Dallas
Inv. Co. v. Peace, supra note 5; People v. Stanton, supra note 2.
s Landay v. MacWilliams, 173 Md. 460, 196 Ati. 293 (1938); Freeman v.
Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534 (1934); West Brothers Brick
Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).
10 State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberbe, 278 U.S. 116
(1928); State ex rel Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017 (1916);
Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
11 Forde v. Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, I So. 2d 642 (1941); Standard Oil Co.
v. Bowling Green, supra note 2; Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 228
228 N.W. 707 (1930.)
"
Geneva Inv. Co. v. St. Louis, supra note 4; Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning 37 Harv. L. Rev. 834, 847, et seq. (1924).
'
Genev- Inv. Co. v. St. Louis, supra note 4; Wittkop v. Garver, 4 N.J. Misc.
234, 132 Atl. 339 (1926). But cf. Franklin Street Methodist Episcopal Church v.
Crystal Oil & Gas Co., 309 Pa. 357, 163 Atl. 910 (1932).
14 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Roberts, 62 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1933); State ex rel
King v. Friar, 165 Okla. 145, 25 P.2d 620 (1933). But, filling stations are not a
nuisance per se. Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., supra note 5; Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., supra note 11.
15 Pocomoke City v. Standard Oil Co., 162 Md. 368, 159 Atl. 902 (1932); Interstate Oil Co. v. Orange, supra note 5; Higgs v. Martin, 164 Tenn. 465, 51 S.W.2d
237 (1932).
1
Fla. Stat. Ann. §
176.02, 176.04, 176.05, 176.06 (1949).
17 N. D. Rev. Code §§ 40-4701, 40-4703, 40-4704, 40-4705 (1943).
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It is reasonable to assert that a like result could obtain here under
similar conditions.
In summary it may be said that present property uses can not be
restricted for public use by an arbitrary exercise of the police power
when the property owner should be compensated in eminent domain
proceedings;" and, these zoning ordinances, passed according to a
valid exercise of the police power, must be directed toward the concrete objective of promoting the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare."
TAXATION-FEDERAL
DINARY AND NECESSARY

INCOME TAx-EDUCATIONAL TRAINING AS AN OR-

BusINESs EXPENSE.

Plaintiff, a Virginia school

teacher, was required by statute to obtain a renewal of her teaching certificate from the State Board of Education in order to continue
teaching.' In order to obtain a renewal, she was obliged to either
present evidence of college credits in professional or academic courses or pass an examination upon five specified books. Electing to present evidence of further college credits, plaintiff attended summer
school at Columbia University. She deducted the costs incurred in
her 1945 income tax return as "ordinary and necessary business, expenses."' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed this deduction on the ground that the cost of the summer school training
was a personal expense. The Tax Court approved this action, seemingly relying on the presumptive correctness of the Commissioner's
finding and on the principle that legislative grace determines deductibility.' On appeal it was held, that the expenses were deductible
under the circumstances as "ordinary and necessary business expenses" although plaintiff was required to obtain a renewal of her
certificate only once every ten years. Hill v. Commissioner of Int'drwnal Revenue, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
s Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N. W. 159 (1923); cf. State ex rel. Taylor v. Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114 (1931).
"
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 1; Standard Oil Co. v.
Bowling Green, supra note 2.
1 "...No teacher shall be employed.. .unless such teacher holds a certificate
in full force in accordance with the rules of certification laid down by the State
Board of Education. .. " Va. Code Ann. tit. 11, c. 38, § 660 (1942).
2
Int. Rev. Code § 23. "Deductions from Gross Income. In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(a)
Expenses(1)
Trade or Business Expenses(A)
In General-All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business
... traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals
and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business.,.."
3 Int. Rev. Code § 24. "Items Not Deductible. (a)
General Rule-In computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of(1)
Personal, living, or family expenses..
4

Nora Payne Hill, 13 T.C. 291 (1949).

